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Abstract
We study the e⁄ect of international ￿nancial integration on eco-
nomic development when the quality of governance may be compro-
mised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general
equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by
capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-
appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity
for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made
more attractive by ￿nancial liberalisation which, at the same time,
raises e¢ ciency in capital production. Our main results may be sum-
marised as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic develop-
ment, but its e⁄ect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed;
(2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be a⁄ected by both the
development and openness of the economy; (3) ￿nancial liberalisation
is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for
development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty
may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, ￿xtures of an
economy.
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11 Introduction
There is considerable debate about the merits of international ￿nancial inte-
gration.1 To some observers, there can be little or no doubt that liberalising
international capital markets leads to better economic outcomes. This view
is often based on an analogy with trade liberalisation, the bene￿ts of which
are rarely disputed. A more globally integrated and competitive ￿nancial
system is similarly argued to improve resource allocations. Such a system is
presumed to o⁄er greater opportunities for sharing and diversifying risks, and
to provide greater incentives to enhance and maintain e¢ ciency. From the
perspective of an individual economy, dismantling barriers to cross-border
￿nancial transactions may be seen as a relatively swift and painless way of
boosting investment through increased capital in￿ ows. To other observers,
there are strong reasons for believing why ￿nancial liberalisation may do
more harm than good. In the presence of pre-existing distortions and weak
institutional support mechanisms, de-regulating capital markets can exacer-
bate ine¢ ciency and create instability. Countries that do de-regulate without
appropriate safeguards are liable to increase their exposure to more intense,
more frequent and more contagious bouts of adverse speculation that can
fuel recurrent crises. Rather than attracting foreign savings, greater ￿nan-
cial openness may induce a capital out￿ ow from a country and leave it bereft
of resources available for investment.
Empirical investigations have produced inconclusive evidence about which
of the above views is closer to reality.2 Whether international ￿nancial in-
tegration is good or bad for economic performance appears to be contingent
on a number of context-speci￿c factors. Not least of these is the extent to
which ￿nancial markets, both at home and abroad, work smoothly and e¢ -
ciently.3 This is largely a matter of the quality and stability of institutional
structures that govern the functioning of ￿nancial systems. The implication
is that the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalisation are more likely to be bene￿cial
for more developed economies in which these structures are more mature,
more advanced and more robust. With this in mind, it is possible to under-
stand the sobering experiences of many less developed and emerging-market
economies that embarked on large-scale ￿nancial liberalisation programmes
1For recent surveys of the literature, see Edison et al. (2002a) and Eichengreen (2002).
2See, for example, Edison et al. (2002b) and Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), and the
references contained therein.
3According to Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), the e⁄ect of ￿nancial liberalisation on
growth is more likely to be positive when the domestic ￿nancial system is well developed
and the international ￿nancial environment is stable, and is more likely to be negative
when the converse is true.
2during the 1990s (following the precedent set by industrialised nations in the
previous decade). The Asian crisis is widely regarded as a prime example
of what such programmes can lead to when domestic ￿nancial markets are
not well developed and not well supervised. The extensive capital out￿ ows
endured by other transition economies (e.g., the former Soviet republics) can
be interpreted in much the same way. And the massive capital ￿ ight su⁄ered
by a number of African countries (especially those in the sub-Saharan region)
may be seen in the same vein as well.4
In spite of all that has been written on the subject, it is not very often
that one ￿nds discussions of international ￿nancial integration which dwell on
the role of governance and, with this, the issue of corruption.5 Signi￿cantly,
this issue has become one of the leading concerns (if not the leading concern)
amongst all major international development agencies.6 The World Bank, for
example, has identi￿ed corruption as the single greatest obstacle to economic
and social development, and has given priority to anti-corruption initiatives
in its strategies for improving the quality of governance. There are good
reasons for believing why the issue may be important for understanding the
consequences of ￿nancial liberalisation. Perpertrators of corrupt practices
will endeavour to escape detection by trying to conceal their behaviour as
much as they can. Several ways for them to do this are by hiding their
illegal income, by investing this income di⁄erently from legal income and by
altering their patterns of expenditure. Financial liberalisation may be seen
as expanding these opportunities by allowing funds to be taken more freely
across borders where they can be concealed more easily if necessary. With
fewer controls on ￿nancial transactions, it is much easier to launder money
that has been obtained unlawfully. The incentive for individuals to take this
money abroad (rather than to keep it in their own country) is that it is less
4There are many detailed accounts of these events and we refer to just a few. For
discussions of the Asian crisis, see Goldstein (1998), Ito and Kruger (1996) and Lukauskas
and Rivera-Batiz (2001). For evidence of Russian capital ￿ ight, see Cooper and Hardt
(2000) and Abalkin and Whalley (1999). And for details of the African experience, see
Ajayi and Khan (2001), Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) and Collier et al. (1999).
5By corruption is generally meant the abuse of power by public o¢ cials to make personal
gains. The concept of governance is broader than that of corruption, though the two are
intimately connected: just as bad governance fosters corruption, so corruption undermines
good governance.
6See the World Bank and IMF web-sites, www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt
and www.imf.org/external/np/exp/facts/gov. Various surveys of corruption can be found
in Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Tanzi (1998). As is clear
from these, the vast majority of the literature is microeconomic in nature, using partial
equilibrium models to study speci￿c aspects and issues arising from the principal-agent
type relationship between superiors and subordinates in public o¢ ce.
3likely to be discovered and retrieved by the authorities. In this way, ￿nancial
liberalisation may well result in more corruption and lower growth if it is
not backed up by appropriate policies designed to improve the quality of
governance.7
The precise extent to which capital controls serve to limit the laundering
of illegal income is likely to depend on how such income is distributed across
the public sector￿ s hierarchical structure. For individuals at the top of the
hierarchy, there is probably little e⁄ect as the power and in￿ uence wielded at
this level make it possible to ￿ out almost any o¢ cial rules and regulations.
Prime examples of this are various corrupt former leaders and high-ranking
civil servants who, at one time or another, have succeeded in amassing vast
personal fortunes abroad irrespective of how open or how closed their coun-
tries￿capital accounts were meant to be.8 Similarly, but for di⁄erent reasons,
individuals at the bottom of the hierarchy are also unlikely to be a⁄ected
much by the absence or presence of capital controls. Especially in less devel-
oped countries, the petty bribes that low-ranking o¢ cials receive are more
liable to be used to supplement their low salaries for immediate consumption
purposes rather than being saved and hidden abroad. This leaves individuals
in the mid-tier of the hierarchy for whom the degree of ￿nancial openness
is likely to be important. These middle-ranking o¢ cials are sophisticated
enough to extract large amounts of illegal income, but lack the power and
in￿ uence to circumvent restrictions on the transfer of their wealth overseas
- an obstacle that disappears when these restrictions are dismantled. This
may well account for several notable episodes of capital ￿ ight, such as the
$68 billion that Russian residents managed to accumulate abroad during the
7Corruption may tempt even honest individuals to take their funds abroad if they are
able to do so: to the extent that corrupt practices limit the scope for pro￿table investments
at home, individuals may exploit the opportunity to invest elsewhwere were this to be made
available to them.
8Thus it was reported that, by the mid-1980s, Mobutu Sese Seko of former Zaire (now
Congo) had accumulated up to $4 billion in illegal income, much of which was held in
foreign bank accounts. Likewise, during the 1990s, Sani Abacha and his family of Nigeria
were discovered to have assets in London, New York and Switzerland that gave them an
equally illegitimate multi-millionaire status. The amount of embezzled public funds held
in overseas locations by Moussa Traore of Mali is currently thought to be around $2 billion
(equivalent to the value of the country￿ s foreign debt), whilst conservative estimates put
the amount of illicit money syphoned out of the Philippines by Ferdinand Marcos at around
$5 billion (the sum of money that he allegedly o⁄ered to repatriate in the late 1980s in
exchange for being allowed to return to his country without prosecution). Finally, Gustavo
Noboa of Ecuador, Alfonso Portillo of Guatemala and Arnoldo Aleman of Nicaragua have
recently been the subject of investigation for holding bank acounts in the US that are
thought to contain millions of dollars in looted public funds (the last of these persons is
now serving a 20 year prison sentence for his crimes).
4mid-1990s, a period of progressive ￿nancial liberalisation for that country:
according to some estimates, as much as 33 percent of this wealth was of
illegal origin, and 37 percent of semi-legal origin (e.g., Abalkin and Whalley
1999).9
The connection between corruption and ￿nancial liberalisation is evi-
denced in some recent empirical studies based on more formal (econometric)
investigations. Grae⁄ and Mehlkop (2003) re-examine the relationship be-
tween corruption and economic freedom, as studied by several other authors
whose ￿ndings support the typical presumption that the relationship is neg-
ative (e.g., Chafuen and Guzman 2000; Paldam 2002).10 The innovation of
the analysis is the decomposition of the index of freedom into its constituent
parts, each of which is then allowed to have a separate in￿ uence on the index
of corruption. For developing countries, the factor that stands out from all
others is the freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts at home and
abroad, the e⁄ect of which on corruption is shown not only to be the strongest
and most robust of all others, but also to be positive, not negative. In other
words, corruption tends to rise, rather than fall, with fewer ￿nancial market
restrictions. This lends compelling support to the argument that, at least in
less developed economies, corruption is more likely to be fostered, rather than
alleviated, by international ￿nancial integration. Another notable ￿nding is
reported by Neeman et al. (2006) who re-examine the relationship between
corruption and development which has previously been shown to be strongly
negative, with a signi￿cant proportion of the variations in corruption indices
being explained by variations in per-capita income levels (e.g., Ades and Di
Tella 1999; Fisman and Gatti 2002; Paldam 2002; Treisman 2000). The in-
novation in this case is the classi￿cation of countries in terms of their degree
of openness.11 Using a variety of empirical speci￿cations, it is found that the
9As regards the signi￿cance of corruption within the mid-tier of public service, some
revealing studies have been conducted. For example, Hunt and Laszlo (2005) report that
judges in Peru, whilst being involved in only 12 per cent of total bribe cases, obtained
more than 42 per cent of total bribe payments.
10Reliable measures of both variables are now widely available in the form of several in-
dices constructed by various organisations. The most commonly-used indices are the Cor-
ruption Perception Index of Transparency International and the Economic Freedom Index
of the Fraser Institute. The former assesses the extent to which public o¢ cials are believed
to engage in various types of corrupt practice, such as bribery, fraud and embezzlement.
The latter evaluates various aspects of economic freedom, such as freedom of personal
choice, freedom of exchange and freedom to enforce private property rights. Further details
can be found on the appropriate web-sites, www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html]cpi
and www.fraserinstitute.ca/economicfreedom/index.asp?snav=ef.
11The degree of openness of an economy is measured with reference to such factors as
the average level of tari⁄s, the extent of non-tari⁄ barriers to trade and the value of the
black market exchange rate relative to the o¢ cial rate. For further details, see Sachs and
5negative correlation between corruption and development is con￿ned almost
entirely to open economies and that it is the openness of ￿nancial markets,
rather than goods markets, that accounts for this. Again, this lends strong
support to the view that ￿nancial liberalisation is more, not less, likely to
foster corruption.
The foregoing observations provide the motivation for the analysis that
follows. Our objective is to explore the dynamic general equilibrium interac-
tions between economic development, public sector corruption and interna-
tional ￿nancial integration. The analysis is based on a simple model economy
in which bureaucrats, or civil servants, are delegated the task of administer-
ing public policy on behalf of the government. This task entails the provision
of productive public goods and services using the revenues from taxation of
households. Corruption may arise because of the opportunity for bureau-
crats to further their own interests by abusing their positions of authority.
Speci￿cally, bureaucrats have the potential to enrich themselves illegally by
embezzling public funds.12 An individual who does this faces a probability of
being caught, in which case he loses everything, being ￿ned the full amount
of his legal and illegal earnings. The engine of growth in the economy is cap-
ital accumulation, where capital is produced by entrepreneurs using loans
from all public and private agents. These loans are paid back at a rate of
interest speci￿ed in the terms and conditions of mutually-agreeable ￿nancial
contracts.
The model is used to study various scenarios which di⁄er according to
whether corruption is absent or present, and whether ￿nancial markets are
closed or open. Our analysis reveals that the extent to which corruption
a⁄ects growth depends on the extent to which the economy is open, and the
extent to which openness a⁄ects growth depends on the extent to which the
economy is corrupt. Corruption is always bad for growth as the amount of
resources available for capital production is reduced by bureaucrats￿attempts
to conceal their illegal income and the government￿ s attempts to detect this
income. This is made worse by ￿nancial liberalisation because of the extra
Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003).
12Embezzlement - the theft by an individual of resources that he is supposed to admin-
ister - is an especially di¢ cult o⁄ence to deal with when it entails the misappropriation of
public funds. While everyone in society may be a⁄ected, the fact that no private property
is stolen or exchanged means that individuals have no legal rights by which to protest and
seek compensation. This type of non-collusive corruption may pose just as many problems
as more collusive forms, where bene￿ts accrue to all parties involved. It is further worth
noting that corruption in public procurement may be associated with not only a misappro-
priation of public funds, but also a misallocation of these funds (e.g., Mauro 1997; Tanzi
and Davoodi 1997).
6opportunity to launder money abroad.13 At the same time, ￿nancial lib-
eralisation gives an impetus to growth by raising the e¢ ciency of capital
producers in response to a higher world interest rate on loans. This e⁄ect
survives intact when the economy is free from corruption, but may be over-
shadowed by the leakage of illegal funds overseas when corruption exists. The
upshot is that, in terms of both the short-run and long-run performance of
an economy, ￿nancial integration is unambiguously good when governance is
good, but ambiguously good or bad when governance is bad.
In addition to the above, our analysis demonstrates how the incidence of
corruption may be in￿ uenced by both the degree of ￿nancial openness and
the level of economic development. The incentive for a bureaucrat to engage
in corrupt practices depends on the expected gains from behaving in this
way. Ceteris paribus, these gains are higher when ￿nancial markets are liber-
alised (because a bureaucrat can reduce his chances of being apprehended by
sending his illegal income abroad) and when the economy is at a low stage of
development (because a bureaucrat loses less in legal income if he is caught).
Accordingly, corruption is more attractive in economies that are open, rather
than closed, and in economies that are poor, rather than rich. The former
result implies that liberalisation may lead to any of the following outcomes:
an equal or greater number of bureaucrats who are corrupt, a fewer number
of such bureaucrats who are caught and a greater amount of public funds
that each one of them steals. The latter result implies that the relationship
between corruption and development is two-way causal: bureaucratic malfea-
sance not only in￿ uences, but is also in￿ uenced by, economic prosperity. A
consequence of this is the existence of threshold e⁄ects and multiple devel-
opment regimes. Speci￿cally, there is a critical level of capital, below which
corruption is widespread and above which corruption is absent. This critical
turning point is di⁄erent for closed and open economies, the limiting out-
comes of which depend on the feasibility of transition between development
regimes. In the absence of transition there are multiple (history-dependent)
long-run equilibria, including a poverty trap equilibrium in which corruption
remains permanently high.
The implications of our analysis are consistent with a number of empiri-
cal observations. That corruption has adverse e⁄ects on growth and develop-
ment is now well-established as a major stylised fact (e.g., Gyimah-Brempong
2002; Keefer and Knack 1997; Li et al. 2000; Mauro 1995).14 That these ef-
13As indicated earlier, liberalisation may motivate even honest agents to take their
money abroad if corruption restricts investment opportunities at home. Our analysis
abstracts from this partly for simplicity and partly in order to highlight the e⁄ect of
liberalisation on the very incentives that give rise to corrupt behaviour.
14These and other studies also provide evidence on various ways in which corruption
7fects are much stronger in ￿nancially-open economies than ￿nancially-closed
economies accords with the recent ￿ndings of Neeman et al. (2006). That
corruption, itself, is in￿ uenced by economic development is another well-
established emprical regularity (e.g., Ades and Di Tella 1999; Fisman and
Gatti 2002; Montinola and Jackman 1999; Paldam 2002; Treisman 2000).
That corruption is also in￿ uenced by ￿nancial openness concurs with the
recent evidence of Grae⁄ and Mehlkop (2003). That ￿nancial liberalisation
may be either good or bad for economic performance is what experience sug-
gests (e.g., Edison et al. 2002b; Eichengreen and Leblang 2003). And that
corruption and poverty may co-exist as persistent, rather than transient, phe-
nomena is a possibility that has been realised in many developing countries
(e.g., Bardhan 1997; Sah 1988).
Theoretical research on the macroeconomics of misgovernance (especially
from a development perpective) is much less extensive than empirical work
on the subject, though the balance is gradually being redressed.15 Two of
the earliest contributions are credited to Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Sarte
(2000), the former of whom demonstrate how corruption can lead to a di-
version of resources away from growth-promoting activities (investments in
human capital) towards power-seeking activities (investments in political cap-
ital), whilst the latter of whom shows how corruption may cause resources
to be diverted away from the formal (more e¢ cient) sectors of the economy
towards the informal (less e¢ cient) sectors. More recently, Blackburn et al.
(2006) reveal how corruption and development may interact with each other
to produce threshold e⁄ects and multiple (history-dependent) long-run equi-
libria, including a poverty trap equilibrium. Similar results are established in
Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007) who also show how corruption can fos-
ter inequality by compromising the e⁄ectiveness of redistributive policy, and
in Blackburn and Sarmah (2008) who show how corruption can in￿ uence de-
mographic outcomes (life expectancy in particular) through its impact on the
provision of public health expenditures. None of these investigations, which
are all based on closed economy models, address the types of issue that may
arise when considering corruption in an open economy context. One analysis
might take hold, such as lowering rates of investment (e.g., Mauro 1995), creating obstacles
to doing business (e.g., World Bank 2002), reducing in￿ ows of foreign investment (e.g.,
Wei 2000) and causing misallocations of public expenditures (e.g., Mauro 1997; Tanzi and
Davoodi 1997). In contrast, there is very little evidence to support the view that corruption
might actually be good for growth by helping to circumvent cumbersome regulations (red
tape) in the bureacratic process. This is true even for countries that are reportedly mired
with such regulations (e.g., Mauro 1995).
15In a purely static context, Acemoglu and Verdier (1998, 2000) conduct a general
equilibrium analysis of how corruption may form part of an optimal allocation in which
market failure is traded o⁄ against government failure.
8to do so (the only one we know of) is that of Rivera-Batiz (2001) who demon-
strates, as we do, that ￿nancial liberalisation may be either good or bad for
economic development depending on the extent to which the quality of gov-
ernance is good or bad. This result is established in a model that is quite
di⁄erent from ours in a number of respects. First, corruption takes the form
of bribery, whereby bureaucrats receive kickbacks from agents in return for
granting licenses to develop and produce new goods: in our case corruption
manifests as the embezzlement of public funds by bureaucrats. Second, cor-
ruption lowers growth by acting as a tax on innovation, making innovation
less pro￿table and so reducing technological progress: in our case corrup-
tion undermines growth by decreasing the amount of resources available for
productive investments. Third, ￿nancial liberalisation in the presence of cor-
ruption may induce a capital out￿ ow because the domestic return to capital
is lower than the world return: in our case liberalisation with corruption
can lead to capital ￿ ight because of greater opportunities to conceal corrupt
behaviour by laundering illegal income abroad. Fourth, corruption is exoge-
nous to both the state of development and ￿nancial regime of the economy:
in our case corruption can change endogenously as development proceeds
and ￿nancial markets are liberalised. Fifth, equilibirum growth takes place
perpetually at a constant rate which is either raised or lowered permanently
by ￿nancial liberalisation: in our case there are transitional dynamics with
the possibility of multiple (history-dependent) equilibria and a distinction
between the short-run and long-run e⁄ects of liberalisation.16
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
present a generic framework of analysis, describing the basic features of our
model economy that allows for the possibility of corruption. In Section 3 we
consider the case in which the economy is completely closed to international
￿nancial transactions. In Section 4 we turn to the alternative, where the
economy is fully open to such transactions. In Section 5 we study in detail
how ￿nancial liberalisation might a⁄ect the development of the economy. In
Section 6 we make a few concluding remarks.
16These di⁄erences do not imply any rivalry between the present analysis and that of
Rivera-Batiz (2001). Rather, they serve to highlight alternative corruption mechanisms
(of which there are many others) that one may generally think of as co-existing in practice.
Thus, as mentioned earlier, the embezzlement of public funds (on which our own analysis
focuses) can be as equally pervasive as bribery, and has certainly been so in many countries.
Likewise, the direct (deadweight) loss of physical resources arising from corruption (on
which we also focus) can be just as destructive as other costs (such as the distortion of
incentives), and the evidence of capital ￿ ight suggests that many countries have been
severely a› icted by this.
92 A Generic Framework
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0;::;1. There is a constant population
of two-period-lived agents belonging to overlapping generations of dynastic
families. Agents of each generation are divided into three groups of citizens
- households (or workers), entrepreneurs (or producers) and bureaucrats (or
civil servants).17 To save on notation, we normalise the size of each group to
be a measure of unit mass. All agents derive utility from their old-age con-
sumption of output. Households work for entrepreneurs, supplying a ￿xed
amount of labour, ￿ > 1, in return for a wage. Entrepreneurs work for
themselves, producing both capital and output. Bureaucrats work for the
government, administering public policy in return for a salary. Public policy
consists of a programme of taxes and expenditures designed to make avail-
able public goods and services that contribute to the e¢ ciency of output
production. Corruption arises from the incentive of a bureaucrat to appro-
priate public funds for himself. We assume that a fraction, ￿ 2 (0;1), of
bureaucrats are corruptible in this way, while the remaining fraction, 1 ￿ ￿,
are non-corruptible, with the identity of a bureaucrat being unobservable by
the government.18
2.1 The Government
We envisage the government as providing public goods and services which
function as inputs to private production (e.g., Barro 1990). Expenditure
on these services, gt, is assumed to be a ￿xed proportion, ￿ 2 (0;1), of
output. The government also incurs expenditures on bureaucrats￿salaries
17We assume that agents are di⁄erentiated at birth according to their abilities, skills and
opportunities. Entrepreneurs are individuals who have access to production technologies
that are unavailable to others. Households are individuals who, like entrepreneurs, lack
the skills necessary to become bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are individuals who possess these
skills and who are induced to take up public o¢ ce by an allocation of talent condition
established below. Thus, as in other analyses (e.g., Blackburn et al. 2006; Rivera-Batiz
2001; Sarte 2000), we abstract from issues relating to occupational choice. In doing so we
are able to simplify the analysis by not having to consider possible changes in the size of
the bureaucracy and possible changes in the level of corruption that may result from this.
18This assumption may be thought of as capturing di⁄erences in the propensities of
bureaucrats to engage in corruption, whether due to di⁄erences in pro￿ciencies at being
corrupt or di⁄erences in moral attitudes towards being corrupt (e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier
2000; Blackburn et al. 2006). The main purpose of the assumption is to allow us to
determine the wages of bureaucrats in a relatively straightforward way that does not
demand additional assumptions about how public sector pay is determined. In fact, all
we need for this purpose is that there be at least one bureaucrat who is non-corruptible -
all other bureaucrats may well be potential transgressors.
10which are determined as follows. Any bureaucrat (whether corruptible or
non-corruptible) can work for an entrepreneur to receive an income equal
to the wage paid to households. Any bureaucrat who is willing to accept a
salary less than this wage must be expecting to receive compensation through
some form of malpractice and is therefore immediately identi￿ed as being cor-
rupt. As in other analyses (e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier 1998; Blackburn et
al. 2006), we assume that a bureaucrat who is discovered to be corrupt is
subject to the maximum ￿ne of having all of his income con￿scated (i.e., he
is dismissed without pay). Given this, then no corruptible bureaucrat would
ever reveal himself in the way described above. As such, the government
can minimise its labour costs, while ensuring complete bureaucratic partic-
ipation, by setting the salaries of all bureaucrats equal to the wage paid by
entrepreneurs to households.19
The government ￿nances its expenditures each period by running a con-
tinuously balanced budget. Its revenues consist of taxes collected from house-
holds, plus any ￿nes imposed on bureaucrats who are caught engaging in
corruption. We denote by ￿t the lump-sum tax levied on each household.
Since the government knows how much tax revenue is due in the absence of
corruption (since it knows the number of households and since it is responsi-
ble for setting taxes), any shortfall of public funds below this amount reveals
that some funds are being misappropriated. Under such circumstances, the
government investigates the behaviour of bureaucrats using a coslty and im-
precise monitoring technology. This technology entails d units of additional
expenditure and implies that a bureaucrat who is corrupt faces a probability,
p 2 (0;1), of avoiding detection, and a probability, 1 ￿ p, of being found
out.20
19This has the usual interpretation of an allocation of talent condition. The government
cannot force any of the potential bureaucrats to actually take up public o¢ ce, but it
induces all of them to do so by paying what they would earn elsewhere.
20One may wish to formalise this technology more explicitly - for example, by modelling
p as a (decreasing) function of d, and determining the latter from some choice problem
of the government. To the extent that lower levels of d would be chosen at lower levels
of development (because of lower government revenues), the implications of our analysis
would be strengthened. For simplicity, however, we follow the approach of others by treat-
ing monitoring activity as exogenous (e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier 1998, 2000; Blackburn
et al. 2006). This approach is not unreasonable in the context of developing economies,
where the will and wherewithal to combat corruption are generally perceived to be weak,
fragile and fragmented.
112.2 Entrepreneurs
Each entrepeneur begins life with zero resources, but has an opportunity to
undertake an investment project from which capital is produced. To exploit
such an opportunity, an entrepreneur must acquire external ￿nance from
other agents (of the same generation). A project is summarised by a produc-
tion technology that dictates how output and e⁄ort at time t are converted
into capital at time t + 1. To be precise, we assume that lt units of loans
and et units of entrepreneurial time may be combined to produce xt+1 units
of capital according to
xt+1 = Aetlt; A > 0: (1)
The ultimate activity of entrepreneurs is the manufacture of ￿nal output
in the second period of their lives. The inputs to manufacturing are labour
(hired from young households of the next generation) and capital (acquired
from investment projects undertaken previously by entrepreneurs of the cur-
rent generation). A mature entrepreneur employing nt+1 units of labour and







t+1; B > 0; ￿ 2 (0;1); (2)
Labour is hired at the competitively-determined wage rate wt+1, while capital
is rented at the competitively-determined rental rate rt+1. If an entrepreneur
produced xt+1 units of capital when young, then he is a net borrower of
capital if kt+1 ￿ xt+1 > 0 and a net lender of capital if kt+1 ￿ xt+1 < 0. His







wt+1nt+1￿rt+1(kt+1￿xt+1) which is maximised by choosing nt+1 and kt+1 so













that gt+1 = ￿yt+1, together with the fact that nt+1 = ￿ (the ￿xed supply of
labour) in equilibrium, we may write these conditions as
￿wt+1 = ￿bkt+1; (3)
rt+1 = r ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b; (4)
where b = (B￿￿￿
￿)
1
1￿￿. Correspondingly, zt+1 = rxt+1 = rAetlt.
Out of his income, an entrepreneur must repay the loans that were used
to ￿nance his capital production. Let it+1 denote the rate of interest on
loans. Then the entrepreneur enjoys zt+1 ￿ (1 + it+1)lt units of consump-
tion during old-age. His lifetime utility is assumed to be given by log[zt+1 ￿
(1 + it+1)lt] ￿ ￿et, where the last term denotes the disutiliy of e⁄ort spent
on producing capital. Evidently, the entrepreneur will ensure that he ob-
tains the maximum income from output production, in which case his utility
12is log[rAetlt ￿ (1 + it+1)lt] ￿ ￿et. Loans are acquired from households and
bureaucrats who also have access to an alternative means of savings which
yields a ￿xed rate of return of ￿.21 The terms and conditions of borrowing
and lending are stipulated in a ￿nancial contract which requires that a bor-
rower￿ s utility be maximised, subject to a lender￿ s individual rationality (or
participation) constraint. This constraint is simply it+1 ￿ ￿. It is straight-
forward to deduce that the optimal loan contract sets it+1 = ￿ and et = e,
where
e =




The fact that the participation constraint binds means that the contractual
interest rate is equal to the lender￿ s reservation rate of return. The surplus
from the contract accrues to the borrower whose optimal choice of e⁄ort in
capital production is an increasing function of the lending rate.22
2.3 Households
Each young household supplies inelastically ￿ units of labour to old entrepre-
neurs in return for a wage of wt. Each household also receives an inheritance
of qt and is liable to pay lump-sum taxes of ￿t. A household saves its entire
net income, ￿wt ￿ ￿t + qt, in order to ￿nance retirement consumption and
bequests to its own o⁄spring. Given the above, it does this by lending to
entrepreneurs at the rate of interest ￿.
For simplicity, we assume that the household derives linear utility from
consumption and makes bequests according to the ￿ warm-glow￿or ￿ joy-of-
giving￿motive.23 Its lifetime utility is therefore given by (1 + ￿)(￿wt ￿ ￿t +
qt)￿qt+1+u(qt+1), where u(￿) is a strictly concave function that satis￿es the
usual Inada conditions. Evidently, utility is maximised by setting uq(￿) = 1,
implying an optimal ￿xed size of bequest from one generation to the next:
that is qt+1 = q for all t. Changes in household incomes are therefore governed
by changes in wages and changes in taxes.24
21The interpretation of this alternative savings opportunity is given later, being depen-
dent on whether the economy is closed or open.
22Observe that issues of bankruptcy never arise since borrowers are always able to repay
their loans (i.e., rAe(￿) ￿ (1 + ￿) = rA
￿ > 0).
23We introduce bequests into the model merely as a technical device for ensuring the
existence of non-degenerate steady state equilibria. For this reason, we choose the simplest
bequest motive.
24We assume appropriate restrictions on parameter values to ensure that the after-tax
income of a household is always positive.
132.4 Bureaucrats
Each young bureaucrat supplies inelastically one unit of labour to the gov-
ernment to earn a salary of wt. For convenience, we assume that a bureaucrat
has no other source of legal income (i.e., is non-altruistic) and is exempt from
paying any taxes.25 Like all households, all bureaucrats save their entire in-
come at the rate of interest ￿ in order to ￿nance retirement consumption
from which they derive linear utility. The precise role of a bureaucrat is to
act as an agent for the government in the administration of public policy.
In performing this role, a bureaucrat is charged with the responsibility for
controlling public funds. It is because of this delegation of authority that
corruption might arise as a bureaucrat may be tempted to appropriate some
of these funds for himself. As indicated earlier, we assume that there are
some public o¢ cials who are corruptible in this way, and others who are
non-corruptible.
By de￿nition, a bureaucrat who is non-corruptible always abides fully by
the government￿ s instructions for implementing public policy. The income
of such a bureaucrat is simply wt, implying a lifetime utility of (1 + ￿)wt.
In contrast, a bureaucrat who is corruptible may or may not conform to
the rules of public o¢ ce. If he does, then his income is wt, as before. If
he does not, then his income is uncertain and depends on the scale of his
transgression, the chances that he will be caught, and the penalties incurred
if he is exposed. Let ft denote the amount of public funds embezzled by a
corrupt individual. With probability p, the individual escapes detection and
manages to save the amount wt+ft. With probability 1￿p, the individual is
apprehended and left with nothing. We assume that the act of being corrupt
is not entirely costless, but entails some disutility for an agent. For example,
a bureaucrat may need to spend e⁄ort on executing and concealing his illegal
activities, and may also experience some moral shame, or social stigma, from
abusing his privelaged position. It is plausible to imagine that these costs are
higher the larger is the scale of the o⁄ence. We capture this conveniently in
terms of a convex cost (disutility) function that is increasing in the amount
of stolen funds.26 Denoting this function by v(ft), we may then write the
expected lifetime utility of a corrupt bureaucrat as p(1+￿)(wt +ft)￿v(ft).
This is maximised by setting vf(￿) = p(1 + ￿), implying ft = f, where
25Both assumptions are inconsequential for our analysis. The latter of them may be
justi￿ed on the basis that bureaucrats have a lower labour endowment than households.
26Following footnote 20, one may think of non-corruptible bureaucrats as incurring
prohibitively high levels of disutility from corruption.
14f = f(￿;p); (6)
f￿(￿) > 0; fp(￿) > 0:
In words, the bureaucrat embezzles an optimal ￿xed amount of public funds,
and does so on a larger scale the higher is the return on his total savings and
the higher is the probability that he will not be caught.
2.5 The Incentive to be Corrupt
A bureaucrat will engage in corruption if his expected utility from doing so
is no less than his utility from not doing so. From the preceding analysis,
we may state this condition as p(1 + ￿)[wt + f(￿)] ￿ v[f(￿)] ￿ (1 + ￿)wt, or
p(1 + ￿)f(￿) ￿ v[f(￿)] ￿ (1 ￿ p)(1 + ￿)wt. Intutively, a bureaucrat is more
likely to be corrupt the more he stands to gain in illegal income if he is not
caught, the less he expects to lose in legal income if he is caught and the less
is his disutility whichever event transpires. By virtue of (3), the condition
may be re-written as kt ￿ ￿, where
￿ =
￿fp(1 + ￿)f(￿;p) ￿ v[f(￿;p)]g
(1 ￿ p)(1 + ￿)￿b
￿ ￿(￿;p); (7)
￿￿(￿) > 0; ￿p(￿) > 0:
This expression de￿nes a critical (threshold) level of capital, below which
corruption occurs and above which corruption does not occur. The reason
for this is that higher levels of capital, associated with higher wages of all
agents, imply higher costs to bureaucrats if they are caught transgressing.
At su¢ cently large values of kt, these costs are prohibitive and the incentive
to transgress disappears. Accordingly, the model predicts that the incidence
of corruption depends negatively on the level of development. We also note
that the critical level of capital is an increasing function of the interest rate
on loans and the probability that corruption is not detected, both of which
strengthen the incentives to engage in corrupt practices.
2.6 Aggregate Outcomes
The ￿nal component in our description of the economy is the process by
which development takes place. This process is summarised by the dynamic
path of capital accumulation, obtained from (1) and (5), together with the
equilibrium conditions that the total demand for capital, kt+1, is equal to the
total supply of capital, xt+1, and that the total demand for loans, lt, is equal
to the total supply of loans, st. That is,
kt+1 = Ae(￿)st (8)
15A precise expression for the supply of loanable funds is derived in our
subsequent analysis. For now, we note that, to the extent that these funds
include the savings of households, it is necessary to consider how corruption
a⁄ects public ￿nances since the state of the government￿ s balance sheet dic-
tates the level of household taxation required to maintain budget balance.
To begin with, recall that ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) is the fraction of bureaucrats who are
corruptible (non-corruptible) and that p (1 ￿ p) is the fraction of corrupt
bureaucrats who succeed (fail) in evading detection. In a non-corrupt en-
vironment the government needs to cover its expenditures on bureaucrats￿
salaries, wt, and public goods, gt. The level of taxes in this case is therefore
b ￿t = wt + gt: (9)
In a corrupt environment the government incurs the same expenditures as
above, but recoups (1 ￿ p)￿wt in the salaries of corrupt bureaucrats who
are caught, whilst losing p￿f(￿) in public funds to corrupt bureaucrat who
are not caught and whilst also making an additional d units of outlay on
monitoring.27 The level of taxes in this case is therefore
e ￿t = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿]wt + gt + p￿f(￿;p) + d: (10)
A comparison of (9) and (10) reveals that, for any given wt and gt, e ￿t > b ￿t:
taxes are higher in a corrupt environment than in a non-corrupt environ-
ment.28 This follows from the fact that corruption entails both a loss of
public funds and an increase in expenditures for the government. In spite of
the extra revenue from ￿nes, taxes must be raised in order for the government
to balance its budget.
When embezzlement takes place, the total amount of stolen public funds,
p￿f(￿), provides a natural measure of the aggregate incidence of corruption.
This measure comprises the proportion of bureaucrats who are corrupt, ￿,
the fraction of these bureaucrats who evade detection, p, and the amount
of funds that each bureaucrat steals, f. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the
value of any of these components puts the economy on a higher corruption
rating.29
27The loss in public funds, p￿f(￿), comprises the total amount of embezzled resources,
￿f(￿), less the amount that is seized back from those culprits who are caught, (1￿p)￿f(￿).
28This result is established by noting that e ￿t = b ￿t+￿[pf(￿)￿(1￿p)wt]+d and observing
that [pf(￿) ￿ (1 ￿ p)wt] > 0 as an implication of the condition for corruption to occur.
29More generally, the incidence of corruption can be thought of as p￿￿f, where ￿ is
the number of corrupt corruptible bureaucrats. Our analysis implies that either ￿ = 0 or
￿ = 1, with f being ￿xed and the same for all bureaucrats. These features are instilled
into the model for convenience and are inconsequential for our main results. Smoother,
163 A Closed Economy
In the analysis that follows we consider our model economy as being isolated
from international ￿nancial markets, access to which by agents is completely
closed. Under such circumstances, lenders have a reservation rate of return
on savings equal to ￿c, while bureaucrats face a probability of succeeding in
corruption equal to pc. Correspondingly, ec = e(￿c) from (5), fc = f(￿c;pc)
from (6) and ￿c = ￿(￿c;pc) from (7). The interpretation of ￿c is that it
represents the rate of return which households and bureaucrats are able to
earn by accessing a storage technology as an alternative to making loans to
entrepreneurs.
The supply of loanable funds, sc
t, is equal to the total savings of households
plus the total savings of bureaucrats, both of which depend on whether or
not corruption exists.30 In the absence of corruption, each household saves
￿wt ￿ b ￿t + q and each bureaucrat saves wt, implying a total loan supply of
b sc
t = (1 + ￿)wt ￿ b ￿t + q. In the presence of corruption, each household saves
￿wt ￿ e ￿t + q, each non-corruptible bureaucrat saves wt and each corruptible
bureaucrat saves either wt+fc with probability pc or nothing with probability
1￿pc, implying a total loan supply of e sc
t = [1+￿￿(1￿pc)￿]wt￿e ￿t+q+pc￿fc.
These results, in conjunction with others, may now be used to derive two
alternative paths of capital accumulation. Thus, we recall the expressions
for wt, b ￿t and e ￿t in (3), (9) and (10), and note that gt = ￿bkt. It then follows





c[(￿ ￿ ￿)bkt + q] ￿ b T
c(kt); (11)




c[(￿ ￿ ￿)bkt ￿ d + q] ￿ e T
c(kt): (12)
Assuming that Aec(￿ ￿ ￿)b 2 (0;1) and q > d, both of the transition
paths in (11) and (12) exhibit stationary points associated with the steady
state levels of capital b kc￿ =
Aecq
1￿Aec(￿￿￿)b and e kc￿ =
Aec(q￿d)
1￿Aec(￿￿￿)b, respectively.31
Evidently, e kc￿ < b kc￿ which follows from the fact that, for any given kt,
more gradual variations in the level of corruption can be incorporated by allowing for such
variations in ￿ and/or f (e.g., through some form of heterogeneity among bureaucrats, or
through the mechanism modelled in Blackburn et al. (2006)).
30Since the rate of interest on loans is equal to the rate of return on storage, households
and bureaucrats are indi⁄erent between lending and not lending to entrepreneurs. We
assume the usual tie-breaking convention that they opt for the former.
31A necessary condition for the ￿rst parameter restriction is that ￿ > ￿. Since ￿ (￿) is
the share of labour (government expenditure) in national income, this condition is satis￿ed
empirically.
17e T c(￿) < b T c(￿). Accordingly, capital accumulation is lower under corruption
than under non-corruption, which is to say that corruption has an adverse
e⁄ect on economic development. This is due to the costly monitoring of
bureaucratic behaviour (the term d in (12)) which leads to a loss of resources
available for productive investments.32
Combining the above results with those obtained earlier, we arrive at the
conclusion that corruption and development are linked in a relationship that
is both negative and two-way causal: just as bad quality governance fosters
a lack of prosperity, so a lack of prosperity fosters bad quality governance.
This implies the existence of multiple development regimes and the possibil-
ity of multiple, history-dependent long-run equilibria. Recall that corruption
occurs (does not occur) for any level of capital, kt, below (above) the critical
level, ￿c. Under such circumstances, the economy is in a low (high) devel-
opment regime, evolving along the low (high) transition path e T c(￿) (b T c(￿)).
For a given initial capital stock of k0 < ￿c, the ￿nal outcome of the economy
depends crucially on whether ￿c < e kc￿ or ￿c > e kc￿. We illustrate this in Fig-
ure 1. Suppose that ￿c < e kc￿. Then the economy evolves along e T c(￿) until
it reaches ￿c, at which point it jumps to b T c(￿) and subsequently converges
to b kc￿. This chain of events describes a process of transition from the low
development regime with high corruption to the high development with low
corruption. Now suppose that ￿c > e kc￿. Then the economy is locked forever
on e T c(￿), converging irrevocably to e kc￿. In this case there is no transition
and the economy remains permanently poor and corrupt. To the extent that
b kc￿ could be achieved if k0 > ￿c, the model now presents a situation in which
limiting outcomes depend fundamentally on initial conditions, with one such
outcome being a poverty trap equilibrium.
4 An Open Economy
We now consider the scenario in which our model economy is integrated into
world ￿nancial markets, having opened its borders to international borrowing
32Of course, monitoring is essential if the government is to stand any chance of recouping
stolen funds (which would serve to reduce the tax burden on households). Note that, as
matters stand at present, d is the only cost to growth associated with corruption. It
is easy to imagine how a similar cost might arise from the subterfuge of bureaucrats as
resources are diverted away from savings towards the concealment of corrupt behaviour
(e.g., Blackburn et al. 2006). A key aspect of our analysis is to show why this type of
deadweight loss is likely to be greater in an open economy than in a closed economy. The
most direct way of doing this is to simply assume, as we do, that there is no such loss in
the case of the latter as all income (both legal and illegal) is invested in domestic capital
production.
18and lending. In this case the minimum rate of interest on loans acceptable to
lenders is given by ￿o and the probability that a corrupt bureaucrat will evade
detection is given by po. Correspondingly, eo = e(￿o) from (5), fo = f(￿o;po)
from (6) and ￿o = ￿(￿o;po) from (7). Treating the economy as small, ￿o
is understood to be the exogenously-given world rate of interest which we
assume to be greater than the domestic rate of return on storage, ￿c, implying
that storage is redundant. This assumption is made because, ceteris paribus,
the converse situation would put the economy in a position of attracting
all of the worlds￿capital, which would not only contradict the economy￿ s
small country status, but which would also be at odds with much of the
empirical evidence on the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalisation.33 As regards po,
we also assume that this is greater than pc, implying that corrupt public
o¢ cials stand a better chance of evading detection when the economy is
open than when it is closed. This assumption is meant to capture the idea
that illegally-obtained income is less likely to be discovered and reclaimed by
the authorities if it can be laundered abroad than if it is con￿ned at home.
Given the above, we may identify four immediate e⁄ects of ￿nancial lib-
eralisation. The ￿rst is that capital production is undertaken more e¢ ciently
(eo > ec) as entrepreneurs respond to the higher world interest rate on loans
by raising their input of e⁄ort. The second is that a bureaucrat who is corrupt
embezzles more in public funds (fo > fc) as both legal and illegal savings
earn a higher rate of return, and as the latter is less likely to be detected.
The third is that, under such circumstances, the aggregate incidence of cor-
ruption increases (po￿fo > pc￿fc) not only because each corrupt bureaucrat
steals more, but also because more of them avoid being caught. And the
fourth is that the critical level of capital increases (￿o > ￿c) as the incentive
for bureaucrats to engage in corrupt practices is strengthened for reasons
already given. These e⁄ects have a number of important implications, one of
which is the following. For any given level of capital, three possible scenarios
exist - namely, kt > ￿o > ￿c, kt < ￿c < ￿o and ￿c < kt < ￿o. Under none
of these circumstances is the level of corruption lower in an open economy
than in a closed economy: in the ￿rst instance corruption is absent in both
types of economy; in the second instance corruption is present in both types
of economy, but is higher in the former since po￿fo > pc￿fc; and in the third
instance corruption is present only in the former. These results accord with
the recent empirical evidence of a positive correlation between the incidence
of corruption and the degree of ￿nancial openness.
33In addition, it has been argued that interest rates in developing countries are in￿ ated
because of risk factors, and are often lower than world interest rates when these factors
are removed (e.g., Lucas 1990). Our assumption is consistent with this, given that there
is no risk in our model.
19Like before, the supply of loanable funds to entrepreneurs, so
t, is de-
termined from the savings of households and bureaucrats.34 Unlike be-
fore, the amount of loans is not always equal to the amount of savings.
Equality continues to hold in the absence of corruption, where each house-
hold saves ￿wt ￿ b ￿t + q, each bureaucrat saves wt and total loan supply is
b so
t = (1+￿)wt￿b ￿t+q. Equality does not hold in the presence of corruption:
whilst each household saves and lends ￿wt ￿ e ￿t + q, and whilst each non-
corrupt bureaucrat does the same with wt, each corrupt bureaucrat saves
and lends di⁄erent amounts. This is because of the opportunity to invest
abroad, an opportunity that a corrupt agent exploits in order to reduce his
chances of being caught. To ￿x ideas, we assume that legal income is still
lent in the usual way to entrepreneurs, but that illegal income is transferred
out of the economy to be laundered overseas. Under such circumstances,
each corrupt bureaucrat lends either wt with probability po or nothing with
probability 1 ￿ po. It follows that the total supply of loans in the case of
corruption is e so
t = [1+￿￿(1￿pc)￿]wt ￿e ￿t +q. As in our previous analysis,
we may now derive two capital accumulation paths using the expressions for
wt, b ￿t and e ￿t in (3), (9) and (10), together with gt = ￿bkt. Doing this gives




o[(￿ ￿ ￿)bkt + q] ￿ b T
o(kt); (13)




o[(￿ ￿ ￿)bkt ￿ d ￿ p
o￿f
o + q] ￿ e T
o(kt): (14)
Under the parameter restrictions Aeo(￿ ￿￿)b 2 (0;1) and q > d+po￿fo,
both of the transition functions in (13) and (14) imply convergence to ￿xed
point outcomes corresponding to the steady state levels of capital b ko￿ =
Aeoq
1￿Aeo(￿￿￿)b and e ko￿ =
Aeo(q￿d￿po￿fo)
1￿Aeo(￿￿￿)b , respectively. Like the case in which the
economy is closed, e ko￿ < b ko￿ since e T o(￿) < b T o(￿) for any given kt. Thus
34As in the closed economy case, there is a single rate of interest at which households
and bureaucrats can save, making them indi⁄erent between lending and not lending to
entrepreneurs. Applying the same tie-breaking convention as before, we assume that
they choose the former, unless other considerations dictate di⁄erently. This assumption
is also consistent with the well-known home bias phenemonon, meaning the tendency of
individuals to invest domestically even when they could bene￿t by diversifying abroad
(e.g., French and Poterba 1991). Since there is also no reason in our model why savings
should be attracted from overseas, we may proceed on the basis that, ceteris paribus,
￿nancial liberalisation is neutral with respect to in￿ uencing net (o¢ cial) capital ￿ ows.
This serves as a useful benchmark, especially given the con￿ icting empirical evidence on
the issue, some of the most recent of which suggests that neutrality is, indeed, a good
description of events (e.g., Aizenman et al. 2005).
20corruption continues to depress capital accumulation and growth. Observe,
however, that the e⁄ect of corruption is greater under present circumstances
when the economy is open. In addition to the costs of monitoring (the term d
in (14)), there is a further loss of resources due to the leakage of illegal income
abroad (the term po￿fo in (14)) as a consequence of the subterfuge of corrupt
public o¢ cials. This leakage does not occur in a closed economy, where all
savings (whether legal or illegal) ￿nd their way into the ￿nancing of domestic
capital production. Our result is consistent with the recent empirical ￿nding
that the adverse e⁄ect of corruption on development is much stronger in
￿nancially-open economies than ￿nancially-closed economies.35
Evidently, the relationship between corruption and development remains
negative and two-way causal when the economy is open. As such, the evo-
lution of the economy and its ￿nal destination depend on the same consid-
erations as applied when ￿nancial markets were closed. In particular, there
are multiple development regimes with the possibility of multiple, long-run
equilibria. For any capital stock, kt, below (above) the critical level, ￿o, the
economy is in a low (high) development regime, being located on the low
(high) transition path e T o(￿) (b T o(￿)) and displaying a high (low) incidence
of corruption. Transition between regimes may or may not be feasible de-
pending on whether ￿o < e ko￿ or ￿o > e ko￿. In the event of the latter, initial
conditions determine limiting outcomes, one of which is a poverty trap equi-
librium. These implications can be illustrated diagrammatically by a simple
re-labelling of Figure 1.
5 Governance, Globalisation and Growth: An
Evaluation
The results obtained so far indicate how the corruptness and openness of an
economy might be important factors in determining various outcomes. The
results also suggest that these factors may interact with each other such that
the e⁄ects of corruption depend on whether or not the economy is open, while
the e⁄ects of opennesss depend on whether or not the economy is corrupt. In
addition, we have seen how corruption and development may display a similar
mutual dependence, each one both in￿ uencing and being in￿ uenced by the
other. These features imply that an analysis of the consquences of ￿nancial
liberalisation can be quite complicated. In what follows we seek to identify
these consequences, establishing conditions under which liberalisation is most
35Indeed, absent monitoring costs and there would be no e⁄ect of corruption in our
closed economy, which is what the evidence more-or-less suggests.
21likely to either foster or impede economic performance.
Financial integration has a number of implications for how the economy
might develop. First, by raising the e¢ ciency of capital production (eo > ec),
it causes the transition function to become steeper, irrespective of whether
or not corruption exists (i.e., b T o
k(￿) > b T c
k(￿) and e T o
k(￿) > e T c
k(￿)). This is
conducive to development. Second, by inducing an out￿ ow of illegal income
(po￿fo), it exacerbates the e⁄ect of corruption in shifting the transition func-
tion downwards (i.e., e T o(0) < e T c(0)). This is not conducive to development.
And third, by strengthening the incentives of individuals to engage in cor-
rupt practices, it causes the critical level of capital to increase (i.e., ￿o > ￿c).
This is also not conducive to development. These competing in￿ uences give
rise to a number of possible outcomes that may be visualised using Figure 2.
For illustrative purposes, we suppose that ￿c < e kc￿ (implying that transition
between development regimes is feasible when the economy is initially closed)
and that e ko￿ < e kc￿ (meaning that the long-run equilibrium of a corrupt open
economy is worse than the long-run equilibrium of a corrupt closed econ-
omy). Assuming otherwise may produce one or two other possible outcomes
to which we refer later. We denote by kL the level of capital, or stage of
development, at which liberalisation takes place. From our earlier observa-
tions, there are three possible scenarios - ￿c < ￿o < kL, ￿c < kL < ￿o and
kL < ￿c < ￿o. We consider each in turn.
For the case in which ￿c < ￿o < kL, corruption is not really an issue
since the incentive for bureaucrats to engage in corrupt behaviour vanishes
before liberalisation takes place and remains that way afterwards. Under such
circumstances, the sole e⁄ect of liberalisation is to improve the e¢ ciency
of capital production. Evolving initially along the transition path e T c(￿),
the economy jumps to the higher path b T c(￿) at ￿c and then makes a ￿nal
jump to b T o(￿) on opening its borders. Thereafter, it converges to the steady
state equilibrium at b ko￿. This result shows that ￿nancial liberalisation in the
absence of corruption is unambiguously good for economic development.
For the case in which ￿c < kL < ￿o, corruption is not an issue before
liberalisation but becomes an issue after liberalisation as the incentives of
bureaucrats change. This has e⁄ects which con￿ ict with those arising from
greater e¢ ciency in capital production. As above, the economy is initially
located on e T c(￿) before jumping to b T c(￿) at ￿c, the point at which corruption
disappears. But this is short-lived as the opening of ￿nancial markets lures
bureaucrats back into corrupt behaviour, causing the economy to descend
onto e T o(￿). The ￿nal destination depends on whether ￿o < e ko￿ or ￿o > e ko￿: if
the former, then there is a further stage of transition which sees the incentives
of bureaucrats change again such that the economy jumps back up to b T o(￿)
22at ￿o, returning to a state of non-corruption and converging to b ko￿; if the
latter, then the economy remains on e T o(￿) and becomes saddled forever with
a corrupt bureaucracy in the poverty trap equilibrium at e ko￿. These results
demonstrate that ￿nancial liberalisation in the presence of corruption can be
costly, perhaps very costly, for development. At best, any gains that accrue
are realised only in the long-run after losses have been incurred. At worst,
there are only losses since a poverty trap would not occur if the economy
remained closed.
Finally, for the case in which kL < ￿c < ￿o, corruption is an issue both
before and after liberalisation as the incentive condition determining corrupt
behaviour is satis￿ed at both times. The di⁄erence, of course, is that liberal-
isation allows illegal income to be taken abroad. As above, the e⁄ect of this
competes with the e⁄ect of e¢ ciency gains in capital production. Starting
on e T c(￿) again, the economy jumps down to e T o(￿) at the point that liberalisa-
tion occurs, with subsequent events being dependent on whether ￿o < e ko￿or
￿o > e ko￿ in the manner described above: if the former, then there is a re-
versal of fortunes at ￿o as corruption dissappears and capital accumulation
proceeds along b T o(￿) towards b ko￿; if the latter, then the economy remains on
e T o(￿) and converges towards e ko￿, being mired permanently with corruption
and poverty. These results, like those previously, show that ￿nancial liber-
alisation in the presence of corruption can be detrimental to development,
with the worst outcome being the emergence of a poverty trap that would
not otherwise exist.
For the sake of completeness, we comment brie￿ y on other scenarios not
captured in Figure 2. Suppose that e ko￿ > e kc￿ (so that the poverty trap
equilibrium with liberalisation lies above the poverty trap equilibrium with-
out liberalisation). Then, ceteris paribus, the above results are unchanged:
the ￿nal outcome for the economy is either b ko￿ or e ko￿ depending on the
circumstances described. Suppose, next, that ￿c > e kc￿ (so that transition
between development regimes is never possible when the economy is closed).
If ￿o > e ko￿ as well, then transition is also not possible when the economy is
open and the limiting outcome is the poverty trap equilibrium at e ko￿. But if
￿o < e ko￿, then liberalisation makes transition feasible and the ￿nal destina-
tion is b ko￿. This is really the only instance in which liberalisation produces
such a radical turn of events that the quality of governance and development
of the economy are so dramatically improved.
The foregoing analysis leads us to conclude that governance and corrup-
tion can be vital factors in determining the merits of international ￿nancial
integration. Good quality governance provides assurance that the potential
of integration to improve economic performance is fully realised. Bad quality
23governance implies that this potential may be seriously compromised, if not
completely undermined. Since the quality of governance is, itself, related to
economic performance, then we can also understand how the e⁄ect of integra-
tion is liable to depend on the stage of development at which it takes place:
richer, more developed economies are more likely to bene￿t from ￿nancial
openness than poorer, less developed economies. Finally, the prediction that
corruption may rise (at least initially) with ￿nancial liberalisation would ￿nd
sympathy among many development experts: for example, it is frequently
alleged that this has often been a feature of transition economies.
6 Final Remarks
Advocates of international ￿nancial integration would claim that disman-
tling barriers to cross-country capital ￿ ows can only be good for economic
development: with fewer constraints on transactions and greater competi-
tion amongst agents, there are sure to be e¢ ciency gains conducive to higher
growth. Those of a more sceptical disposition would argue quite di⁄erently:
in a second-best world of assorted imperfections, the removal of distortions
from ￿nancial markets alone may actually do more harm than good. Similar
caution may be expressed about the view that any increase in the degree of
economic (and political) freedom is certain to improve the quality of gover-
nance by reducing the extent of corruption. A more re￿ned argument would
contend that this need not be the case as greater freedom brings with it
new incentives and new opportunities for individuals to engage in corrupt
practices.
The above considerations have provided the motivation for this paper.
Our objective has been to analyse precisely how the liberalisation of ￿nan-
cial markets might a⁄ect the long-run development of an economy in which
the level of corruption may, itself, change endogenously with changes in the
circumstances of individuals. Our principal ￿ndings may be summarised as
follows: ￿rst, corruption is always detrimental to economic development, but
its e⁄ect is worse when ￿nancial markets are liberalised than when they are
not; second, the extent of corruption is more likely to be higher in ￿nancially-
open economies than ￿nancially-closed economies, and in poor countries than
rich countries; third, ￿nancial liberalisation is good for development if gov-
ernance is good, but may be bad (perhaps very bad) for development if
governance is bad; and fourth, corruption and poverty may co-exist as per-
sistent features of an economy unless fundamental reforms take place. These
results accord well with empirical observations and indicate the importance
of taking into account the political economy aspects of ￿nancial liberalisation
24when evaluating the consequences that liberalisation might have.
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